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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
COMMERCIAL LAW-A Farmer Is Not a "Merchant" 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code-
Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis* 
Plaintiff grain company allegedly entered into an oral contract 
to purchase 5,000 bushels of soybeans from the defendant farmer. 
The grain company signed a written integration of the alleged oral 
agreement and mailed it to the farmer, with a request for his signa-
ture. The farmer neither signed the document nor attempted to 
communicate with the grain company and later refused to deliver 
the soybeans pursuant to the terms of the plaintiff's memorandum. 
In an action for breach of contract, the grain company contended 
that the farmer was precluded from relying on the statute of frauds, 
as incorporated in the Uniform Commercial Code,1 by virtue of 
his failure to object to the company's memorandum of the agree-
ment.2 The trial court, however, allowed the statute of frauds de-
fense, and, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, held, 
affirmed.3 A farmer is not a "merchant" as that term is used in the 
Code and consequently, he is not obliged to give notice of an ob-
jection to a ·written confirmation of an oral agreement. 
Section 2-201(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that 
"a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is 
not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some 
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made 
between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought .... " An exception to this general provision is made 
for dealings between merchants in section 2-201 (2) which states that 
"if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the con-
tract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party re-
ceiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the require-
ments. of ... [the statute of frauds] against such party unless written 
notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days after it is 
received." In giving special treatment to merchants, the Uniform 
Commercial Code has borrowed a concept that had its genesis in 
the common law.4 Perhaps it is for this reason that the court in the 
• 395 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1965) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(1) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.J. The u.c.c. 
was adopted in Arkansas in 1961 • .ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85 (1961 Addendum). 
2. u.c.c. § 2-201(2). 
3. Principal case at 557. 
4. The Official Comments to U.C.C. § 2-104 explain that merchant, as defined in the 
U.C.C., has its roots in the "law merchant" concept, which was a body of law devel-
oped in England and on the Continent to regulate the business dealings of merchants 
and mariners. See generally BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAw MERCHANT (pt. 1) 
(1923); SANBORN, ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW 
(1930). Special provisions for merchants were also found in the predecessor of the 
[ 345] 
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principal case looked to the common law in determining whether 
farmers have been traditionally classified as merchants.15 The court, 
however, failed to recognize that the word "merchant" is incorpo-
rated in the Code as a term of art and it is given a specific definition 
which is not entirely coincident with the common law or commonly 
accepted definition of the term. Regardless of the wisdom of the 
drafters of the Code in describing a professional in business by a 
word which suggests to many a corner storekeeper,6 the decision in 
the principal case, by failing to examine the Code's purpose in for-
mulating a higher standard of commercial conduct for merchants, 
only adds to the confusion.7 
A merchant is defined by section 2-104 as a "person who deals in 
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out 
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods in-
volved in the transaction." The official comments to that section set 
forth three criteria to be used in determining whether a given indi-
vidual, in a particular situation, is to be held to the standards of a 
merchant: professionalism, special knowledge, and commercial ex-
perience.8 In light of these three criteria, it would seem that the 
court in the principal case should have concluded that the defendant 
farmer was a "merchant" within the meaning of section 2-201(2).9 
The first criterion focuses on the professionalism of the indi-
vidual. The writers of the official comments point out that the casual 
or inexperienced buyer or seller is not to be held to the standards set 
for the professional in business.10 That the defendant was a profes-
u.c.c., the Uniform Sales Act. E.g., UNIFORM SALES Aar §§ 15(1), 15(2), 16(c). See 
generally Trisdale, Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Law of Contracts, 
39 N.D.L. R.Ev. 7 (1963). 
5. Principal case at 557. Quoting from 27 WORDS AND PHRASES 136 (1961), the coun 
cited In re Rl!gsdale, 20 Fed. Cas. 175 (No. 11530) (D. Ind. 1876) and Dyett v. 
Letcher, 29 Ky. (6 J.J. Marshall) 541, 543 (1831). 
6. Judicial decisions which have attempted to give the term merchant its ordinary 
meaning reflect the connotations commonly associated with that term. E.g., Seeley v. 
Helvering, 77 F.2d 323, 324 (2d Cir. 1935) ("He is a middleman in distributing the 
goods"); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. City of Broken Bow, 184 Okla. 362, 363, 87 P .2d 
319, 321 (1939) ("A merchant is one who buys to sell, or buys and sells, goods or 
merchandise in a store or shop''): White v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 484, 485 (1884) 
("[A merchant is] a dealer in goods, wares, and merchandise, who has the same on 
hand for sale and present delivery''). 
7. See Hall, Article 2-Sales-"From Statutes to Contract"?, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 209, 
212; Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 427, 
431 (1950). 
8. U.C.C. § 2-104, comments I and 2. 
9. The commentators that have considered the farmer-merchant question have 
generally agreed that a farmer can be a merchant under the Code. However, they 
have not specified the particular merchant provisions that should be applicable to 
farmers, nor have they explained which aspect of the merchant definition encom-
passes farmers. See Hall, supra note 7, at 212; Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed 
Code, 16 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 3, 15 n.50 (1951); Waite, The Proposed New Uniform 
Sales Act, 48 MICH. L. REv. 603, 618 &: n.20 (1950). 
10, u.c.c. § 2-104, C9tmnent 1. , 
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sional as opposed to a casual or inexperienced seller of farm prod-
ucts is evidenced by the extent of his fanning operations. The de-
fendant testified that he was born and raised on a farm, and that in 
1960 he had begun farming a 550 acre tract, 325 acres of which were 
used for growing soybeans. The value of one year's soybean crop, 
which covered only sixty per cent of his available acreage, was about 
$12,700.11 On the basis of this evidence, the conclusion seems ines-
capable that the farmer was a professional in the growing and mar-
keting of soybeans and was, therefore, the type of individual with 
which the merchant provisions of the Code are concerned. Although 
the size of the defendant's operation warranted the conclusion that 
he was a professional, one who has a small land holding and who 
markets his products less frequently would not automatically be 
adjudicated a merchant. A case by case determination12 of which 
particular farmers are to be deemed merchants is in no way incon-
sistent with the Code's goal of uniformity13-all those who are found 
to be merchants are treated equally, but inclusion in the class is to 
be determined upon an examination of individual situations. 
The second criterion focuses on the reasonableness of charging 
a given individual with the specialized knowledge of the goods or 
practices involved in his particular line of trade.14 Actual knowledge 
is not requisite; it is sufficient that the individual merely create the 
impression of familiarity with the particular goods or practices. It 
should also be noted that the drafters of the Code did not intend to 
distinguish the marketing of crops from the sale of other products 
that are more readily associated with the generic term "goods." In-
deed, the Code specifically provides that growing crops are within 
the definition of the general tenn.15 The defendant's experience in 
farming and the size of his operation should warrant the conclusion 
that he did possess the specialized knowledge of both the goods and 
the practices of the soybean market so as to make him a merchant 
in this respect. 
Finally, to be a merchant, it is necessary that the individual have 
some expertise with regard to the particular trade practice in ques-
tion.16 Again, the individual need not actually have acquired this 
expertise, but only be in a position where it would be reasonable 
to assume that he had acquired it. In the principal case, the practice 
at issue was the answering of a memorandum received in the mail 
confirming an oral contract. The writers of the official comments to 
11. Letter From Elton A. Rieves, III, to the Michigan Law Review, June 6, 1966. 
12. See generally Comments to U.C.C. § 2-104. 
13. U.C.C. § l-102(2)(c). 
14. u.c.c. § 2-104(1). 
15. U.C.C. § 2-105(1). See also U.C.C. § 2-107(2). 
16. U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2, states: "(A] lawyer or bank president buying fishing 
tackle for his own use is not a merchant." This comment suggests that a person can 
be a merchant with respect to some transactions and not others. 
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section 2-104 evidently believed that almost everyone has sufficient 
business expertise in the practice of answering mail to qualify as a 
merchant with respect to this trade practice: 
Sections 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207 and 2-209 dealing with the statute of 
frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda and modification rest 
on normal business practices which are or ought to be typical of and 
familiar to any person in business. For purposes of these sections 
almost every person in business would, therefore, be deemed to be 
a "merchant" under the language "who .•. by his occupation holds 
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices 
. . . involved in the transaction . . ." since the practices involved 
in the transaction are nonspecialized business practices such as an-
swering mail.17 
It is evident from the above, that, concerning the exception to the 
use of the defense of the statute of frauds, the term merchant was 
intended to be interpreted broadly. The purpose underlying this 
exception was to make persons participating in business transactions 
responsible for informing other parties of their intentions regard-
ing contracts. It would not seem too great a burden upon the farm.er 
in the principal case to require him simply to answer his mail. Cer-
tainly, if he enters the market each year to sell his products, he can 
and should be held to the same standard of conduct applied to 
others conducting their business in that market. As the comment 
quoted above suggests, a given farmer may be considered a merchant 
as to those practices of which he has specialized knowledge or some 
expertise, without being held to the standards· of a merchant in 
other business dealings with which he is unfamiliar. In the principal 
case, the court's categorical holding that farmers are not merchants, 
went much farther than was necessary to decide the issue before it-
whether the farmer was a merchant regarding the practice of an-
swering mail-and, in so holding, the court apparently overlooked 
the intended flexibility of the merchant provisions incorporated in 
the Code.18 
As suggested above, almost every individual in business would 
be considered a merchant with respect to those Code sections which 
deal with the statute of frauds,19 firm offers,20 confirmatory memo-
randa,21 and contract modification22 because these involve simple, 
everyday business practices. On the other hand, another group of 
provisions-those dealing with the warranty of merchantability,23 
17. U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2. 
18. See U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2. 
19. u.c.c. § 2-201. 
20. U .c.c. § 2-205. 
21. u.c.c. § 2-207. 
22. u.c.c. § 2-209. 
23. u.c.c. § 2-314. 
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the retention of possession by a merchant seller,24 and the entrusting 
of possession to a merchant who deals in goods of the kind25-re-
quires a professional status as to particular kinds of goods, and this 
would suggest that, with respect to these situations, a more restric-
tive definition of the term "merchant"-one limited in its applica-
tion to those who, in the normal course of their business activity, 
deal in the particular goods in question-should be employed. This 
latter group of provisions bears out the fact that a farmer can be a 
merchant in some situations and not in others. While it would ap-
pear that concerning the sections dealing with merchantability and 
retention of possession a farmer should be considered a merchant if 
the transaction in question involves farm products of the type he 
usually raises,26 he should not be deemed a merchant with respect 
to situations involving section 2-403(2). Section 2-403(2) provides 
that a "merchant" who is entrusted with goods of the type in which 
he deals can transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the 
ordinary course of business. However, section 9-307(1) expressly 
excepts a farmer selling farm products from those persons who may 
sell goods to a buyer in the ordinary course of business free of any 
security interest created by the seller. That is, a farmer cannot ex-
tinguish a valid lien on crops he is marketing by the mere act of 
sale. If a farmer were considered a merchant under section 2-403(2), 
it would seem that, contrary to the language of section 9-307(1), he 
could invalidate a security interest in farm products entrusted to 
him; a possible conflict between these provisions can be avoided by 
denying the farmer merchant status under section 2-403(2).27 
A third group of Code provisions-those dealing with general 
contractual duties-applies specifically to persons who are mer-
chants because they have special knowledge of either the commercial 
practices or the particular goods involved.28 A farmer could also be 
24. u.c.c. § 2-402(2). 
25. u.c.c. § 2-403(2). 
26. For purposes of these sections, merchant status should only be attributed to 
a farmer who is experienced in the raising of the particular crop in question. That 
is, a wheat farmer raising corn for the first time should not be held to have warranted 
the merchantability of the latter crop, nor should a dairy farmer, who stores grain 
for a neighbor be deemed to have been entrusted with possession of goods which 
others might think he has authority to sell. 
27. In order to avoid possible conflict and confusion, the Iowa legislature has 
amended § 2-403(2). The following exception has been included after the language 
quoted in the text: 
However, any entrusting of farm products to a person engaged in farming opera-
tions shall not give the farmer the power to transfer all rights of the entruster 
to a buyer in the ordinary course of business if the entruster perfects a security 
interest as provided in Article 9. 
IowA CoDE ANN. § 554.2403(2) (Supp. 1965). Thus, Iowa has expressly excepted farmers 
from the operation of this particular "merchant" provision, in an attempt to make 
more explicit what was obviously intended by the drafters of the Code. 
28. This group includes § 2-103(l)(b), which provides that in the case of a mer-
chant, "good faith" includes observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
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considered a merchant with respect to these provisions because of 
either his experience in the commercial marketing of farm products 
or because of the specialized knowledge he has of the products 
themselves. 
Because the court in the principal case placed unwarranted 
reliance upon common law authority and failed to consider the 
purpose underlying the particular Code provision in question, it is 
doubtful that its decision will be given much weight outside the 
state of Arkansas.29 The decision, however, is evidence of the deep-
rooted feeling of the judiciary, primarily in agricultural states, to 
offer protection to the proverbial "tillers of the soil." This attitude 
is not surprising, for the Code itself has special provisions which 
offer a measure of protection to the farmer.30 However, to decide 
that the farmer in the principal case was a merchant and as such 
is denied the defense of the statute of frauds would not preclude 
a judgment in his favor. The grain company would still have the 
burden of proving both the existence of the oral agreement and its 
terms.31 Indeed, to allow the defense in this particular situation 
would be to permit the statute of frauds to be used as an instru• 
ment of fraud. Assuming that an oral agreement had actually been 
made and that the written integration of that agreement signed by 
the grain company had been received by the farmer, the farmer 
would be in a position to speculate on a contract to which the grain 
company was bound from the moment it mailed the memoran-
dum.32 If the market price fell below the contract price, the farmer 
could produce the paper and hold the grain company to its contract, 
whereas if the market price rose above the contract price, the farmer 
could deny the existence of the contract and sell his crop on the 
open market. The statute of frauds was never intended to sanction 
the repudiation of promises actually made.33 
Because of the importance of agriculture to our economy, to 
deny that a farmer may be considered a merchant is to weaken con-
dealing in the trade; §§ 2-327(I)(c), 2-603, 2-605, dealing generally with the responsi-
bilities of merchant buyers to follow sellers' instructions; § 2-509, concerning risk of 
loss; and § 2-609, providing adequate assurance of performance. 
29. Although to date forty-seven states have adopted the U.C.C., the principal case 
is the first reported decision examining the farmer-merchant question. 
30. See U.C.C. § 9-204(4)(a). 
31. U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 3. 
32. U.C.C. § 2-201(1), makes it clear that the signed memorandum mailed to the 
defendant bound the plaintiff contractually to the terms it contained. It appears that 
the reason the defendant did not desire to hold the plaintiff to this contract, and 
tried to avoid being bound to its terms himself, is that the price called for was $2.54 
per bushel which was considerably below the market price for soybeans at the time 
specified for delivery. The defendant could, therefore, sell his soybeans more profitably 
elsewhere. 
33. For a general discussion of the Statute of Frauds in the U.C.C., see Corbin, 
The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should it be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821 (1950), 
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siderably the Uniform Commercial Code as an instrument which 
regulates the commercial affairs of the country. There does not ap-
pear to be any reason why the contractual dealings surrounding the 
marketing of farm products should not be regulated by the same 
laws that apply to other sales when all of the parties involved are 
experienced in the type of transaction taking place. 
